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UDGE Bruce M. Selya of the First Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals called it a "murky corner of the law."' The lessthan-crystal-clear area referred to by Judge Selya relates to the right
of union representatives to go onto employer property (typically employee or employee-customer parking lots) to attempt to organize employees. In this regard, the 1992 United States Supreme Court decision
in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB 2 has prompted pointed expressions of praise
3
and criticism.
I.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND

The legislative and judicial background of the Lechmere decision may
well be set out in quotations from several earlier Supreme Court decisions that addressed the issue directly or indirectly:
The enactment of the NLRA in 1935 marked a fundamental change
in the Nation's labor policies. Congress expressly recognized that
collective organization of segments of the labor force into bargaining
units capable of exercising economic power comparable to that possessed by employers may produce benefits for the entire economy in
the form of higher wages, job security, and improved working conditions. Congress decided that in the long run those benefits would
outweigh the occasional costs of industrial strife associated with the
organization of unions and the negotiation and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements. The earlier notion that union activity
was a species of "conspiracy" and that strikes and picketing were
examples of unreasonable restraints of trade was replaced by an unequivocal national declaration of policy establishing the legitimacy of
labor unionization
and encouraging the practice of collective
4
bargaining.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61
Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157, guarantees to employees the right "to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." This guarantee includes both the right of union officials to discuss organization
with employees, and the right of employees to discuss organization
among themselves .... Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act, as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed" in Section 7. But organization rights are not
viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on
1. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 319 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. -, 112
S. Ct. 841 (1992).
2. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
3. For scholarly articles praising and condemning, respectively, the Lechmere decision, see generally Michael L. Stevens, The Conflict Between Union Access and Private
PropertyRights: Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY
L.J. 1317 (1992); Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A CriticalAssessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1991).
4. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 190 (1978) [hereinafter Sears], cert. denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980).

19951

BABCOCK/LECHMERE REVISITED

the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages
of organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of
communication to the free exercise of organization rights....
In seeking to provide information essential to the free exercise of
organization rights, union organizers have often engaged in conduct
inconsistent with traditional notions of private property rights. The
Board and the courts have the duty to resolve conflicts between organization rights and property rights, and to seek a proper accommodation between the two. This Court addressed the conflict which
often arises between organization rights and property rights in
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co..... 5
First, the right to organize is at the very core of the purpose for
which the NLRA was enacted. . . . Second, Babcock makes clear
that the interests being protected by according limited-access rights
to nonemployee, union organizers are not those of the organizers but
of the employees located on the employer's property. The Court indicated that "no ... obligation is owed nonemployee organizers";
any right they may have to solicit on an employer's property is a
employees to exercise their
derivative of the right of that employer's
6
organization rights effectively.
[A]n employer may validly post his property against nonemployee
distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to
reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice or
order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution .... This is not a problem of always open or always closed
doors for union organization on company property. Organization
rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National
Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is
consistent with the maintenance of the other. The employer may not
affirmatively interfere with organization; the union may not always
insist that the employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels,
the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the
to permit communication of information on the right
extent needed
7
to organize.
The Babcock & Wilcox opinion established the basic objective
under the Act: accommodation of Section 7 rights and private property rights "with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other." The locus of that accommodation, however, may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on
the nature and strength of the respective Section 7 rights and private
5. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1972) [hereinafter Central
Hardware].
6. Sears, 436 U.S. at 206 n.42.
7. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) [hereinafter Babcock].
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property rights asserted in any given context. In each generic situation, the primary responsibility for making
this accommodation must
8
rest with the Board in the first instance.
II.

NLRB APPROACH PRIOR TO LECHMERE

Prior to Lechmere, for resolving conflicts concerning whether an employer must allow union organizers on its property to contact employees,
the National Labor Relations Board had developed a formula for resolving the conflict between Section 7 rights under the NLRA and the property rights of the employer in its 1988 Jean Country decision. 9 In an oversimplified summary, the formula involved gathering facts on the strength
of the employees' Section 7 rights, the strength of the employer's property rights, and the effectiveness and availability of alternative means of
communication. In balancing these considerations, a decision then would
be made under Jean Country concerning whether the employer would be
required to afford access to its property to the union organizers.1 0 This
approach by the NLRB was approved in the Lechmere case by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. 1
III.

SUPREME COURT REVERSAL OF
JEAN COUNTRY APPROACH
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' Lechmere decision,
finding it inconsistent with the seminal NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox holding. The Court found it was not appropriate to approach each case by
balancing Section 7 rights against property rights and that such an inquiry
was pertinent only when union organizers do not have reasonable access
to employees outside an employer's property.' 2 The Court found that the
Babcock exception "was crafted precisely to protect the Section 7 rights
of those employees who, by virtue of their employment, are isolated from
the ordinary flow of information that characterizes our society."'1 3 The
Court then stated that the union's burden of establishing the requisite
isolation is a heavy one and "one not satisfied by mere conjecture or the
expression of doubts concerning the effectiveness of nontrespassory
means of communication.' 1 4 "Because the employees do not reside on
8. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976) [hereinafter Hudgens].
9. Jean Country and Local 305, Retail and Wholesale Employees Union, 291
N.L.R.B. 11 (1988) [hereinafter Jean Country]; see Rosemary M. Collyer, Union Access:
Developments Since Jean Country, 6 LAB. LAW. 839 (1990); Peter J. Ford, The NLRB, Jean
Country, and Access to Private Property: A Reasonable Alternative to Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication Under Fairmont Hotel, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 683
(1991).
10. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 16-19. For a critical analysis of the Jean Country
approach, see Dianne Avery, Federal Labor Rights and Access to Private Property: The
NLRB and the Right to Exclude, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 145 (1989).
11. Lechmere, 914 F.2d 313, 320-23 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 841
(1992); Employees' Right To Organize, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1991).
12. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 &:Ct. at 848.
13. Id. at 849.
14. Id.
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Lechmere's property," the Court states, "they are presumptively not 'beyond the reach' of the union's message.' u 5 In reviewing the methods of
communication available to the union, the Court concluded, "[tihus, signs
(displayed, for example, from the public grassy strip adjoining Lechmere's parking lot) would have informed the employees about the
union's organizational efforts."' 6 The majority found that no "unique ob17
stacles" existed to the union's reaching the employees.
IV.

DISSENT BY JUSTICES WHITE, BLACKMUN
AND STEVENS

Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissented from
the majority ruling in Lechmere. Justice White emphasized the Babcock
teaching that " '[t]he right of self-organization depends in some measure
on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization
from others.' ",18 Further, he stressed that Babcock requires a correct accommodation between property rights and organizational rights. Justice
White criticized the majority's fashioning a general rule from the Babcock reference to cases in which the living quarters of the employees
place them beyond the reach of the union.' 9 He further emphasized that
actual communication with nonemployee organizers is contemplated in
20
Babcock, not a mere notice that an organization campaign is under way.
In calling the Babcock teaching a neutral and flexible rule of accommodation, Justice White noted that the Court's later Hudgens decision called
for a "locus of accommodation" that will vary with the strengths of the
respective Section 7 rights and private property rights. 21 Lastly, Justice
White condemned the majority for its failure to defer to an administrative
agency in administering a statute in a situation in which Congress had left
open the question of how Section 7 rights and property rights were to be
22
accommodated under the NLRA.
V.

PURPOSE OF ARTICLE

The purpose of these comments is not to merely reanalyze and/or criticize the Lechmere holding. Rather its design is to focus fresh attention on
the basic Section 7 rights that lie at the foundation of the Babcock decision. By better understanding the nature of these judicially recognized
underlying rights bestowed by Congress, judicial results consistent with
the purposes of the NLRA may be more perfectly understood and
realized.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 849-50.
Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 850.
Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113).
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 851 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 852 (White, J., dissenting).
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VI. BABCOCK DECISION FOUNDATIONAL
The Babcock decision is foundational for the current state of the law in
regard to the rights of nonemployee union organizers to enter certain
areas of an employer's property for the purpose of organizing or giving
information to employees. It appears that prior to Babcock, the distinction was not clearly drawn between the rights of employees and nonemployees engaging in union organizational activity on the property of an
employer, with both the nonemployee organizers and employees being
subject to the restrictions currently applied to employee activity. 23 Currently, employees can engage in organizational activities while on duty,
subject to regulations and rules that are reasonably designed to foster
24
matters such as safety and efficiency in the workplace.
Babcock held that the distinction between employee and nonemployee
organizational activity was one of "substance" 25 and set the guidelines of
when nonemployee organizers must be permitted on employer property
for organizational purposes. The Babcock decision limited itself to basic
organizational activities. 26 The Supreme Court in its 1976 Hudgens decision made clear that the Babcock principle of protecting Section 7 rights
extended to other activities protected under the NLRA, i.e. legal employee picketing in connection with a labor dispute arising out of collective bargaining between an employer and a union.27 The Hudgens
decision is important in that it ended a period after the Court's Logan
Valley2 8 decision when shopping malls and similar property were equated
by the Supreme Court as the functional equivalent of public property and
the nonemployee union organizers were held to be exercising constitutionally protected speech rights. The Logan Valley doctrine was expressly
overruled by Hudgens,2 9 which held that in the future the Babcock principle would be used to resolve such questions as nonemployee access to
30
employer property, rather than constitutional standards.
The Babcock decision itself has not been without its detractors, especially concerning the employee-nonemployee distinction regarding orga23. See NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1955); Seamprufe, Inc.,
109 N.L.R.B. 24, 32 (1954); Carolina Mills, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1166 (1951).
24. Dexter L. Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of
Property Rights, 47 GEO. L.J. 266, 272-76, 281 (1958). A seminal case establishing these
rights was Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945). For an analysis of
Republic Aviation, see Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570-71 (1978), and Jay
Gresham, Note, Still as Strangers: Nonemployee Union Organizerson Private Commercial
Property, 62 TEX. L. REV. 111, 115-17 (1983).
25. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113 (1956).
26. Id. at 114. The Central Hardware holding contihued this limitation. 407 U.S. at
544-45.
27. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522.
28. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 315, 318 (1968).
29. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520-21.
30. Id. at 521-22.
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nizational activity on employer property.31 Some commentators have
contended that in view of the very general statutory definition of "employee" in Section 2(3) of the NLRA, 32 the nonemployee union organizers could have been treated as "employees" under the Act, although
they did not have a common law employee-employer relationship with
the employer.33 In Hudgens, the Court applied the "statutory employee"
principle to pickets even though they were not employees of the owners
of the shopping center or even of the store located in the center where
they were picketing. 34 In that case, the pickets were employees of a separate and remotely located warehouse of the 35company operating the store
in the mall where the picketing took place.
VII.

ESSENCE OF BABCOCK APPROACH

Subsequent panels of the Supreme Court have differed in emphasis
placed on the various elements of the Babcock decision. However, it appears that the decision sets out the following elements:
1. "[The] employer may validly post [its] property against non-employee
distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through
other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the em,,36
ployees with its message ....
not "discriminate against
2. The employer's posting of its property '3must
7
distribution.
other
allowing
by
the union
3. "The right of self-organization [under the NLRA] depends in some
employees to learn the advantages of self-ormeasure on the ability of
'38
ganization from others.
4. These self-organizational rights under the NLRA and the preservation
39
of private property rights are both granted by the federal government.
5. There must be an accommodation between these two sets of rights
with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of
31. "[T]he [Babcock] Court sowed the seeds of confusion that would perplex an entire
generation of labor lawyers and adjudicators." Rodger C. Hartley, The Supreme Court's
1991-1992 Labor and Employment Term, 8 LAB. LAW., 757, 759 (1992). Accord Jay
Gresham, Note, Still as Strangers:Nonemployee Union Organizerson Private Commercial

Property, 62 TEX. L. REV. 111, 118-23 (1983); Russell A. Willis III, A Survey of Recent
Retail Facilities Nonemployee Access Decisions, 32 MERCER L. REV. 797, 799 (1981); see
also the dissent of Justice White in the Lechmere decision. 502 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. at 852-53
(White, J., dissenting). While joining in Justice White's dissent, Justice Stevens did not
agree with Justice White's suggestion that the Babcock case was incorrectly decided. Id. at
854 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise . . . ." Id.
33. See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A CriticalAssessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 11 (1991).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520-21.
Id. at 510 n.3.
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 112.
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the other 4° with the proper
adjustments between the two sets of rights to
41
NLRB.
the
by
made
be
6. "[W]hen the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with [employees]
through the [normal] channels, the [employer's] right to exclude" the
nonemployees from the employer's property must "yield to the extent
needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize
42
[to the employees].
While Supreme Court panels subsequent to Babcock have grasped different parts of the Babcock decision to achieve desired emphasis, none
has indicated basic disagreement with the Babcock holding. Thus, the
Court cites the Babcock ruling with apparent approval in the Central
Hardware,43 Hudgens,44 Sears45 and Lechmere46 decisions.
In the authors' opinion, the employee-nonemployee distinction set out
first in Babcock is a valid one, based on recognized principles of general
property law and founded on a valid distinction between trespassers and
non-trespassers on an employer's property.47 In cases similar to Lechmere, parking areas are open to the public as well as to employees, but
Id.
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
Id.
Central Hardware Co., 407 U.S. at 543-45.
Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522.
Sears, 436 U.S. at 204-05.
Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 845-46.
In Republic Aviation the Court upheld the Board's ruling that an employer
may not prohibit its employees from distributing union organizational literature in nonworking areas of its industrial property during nonworking time,
absent a showing by the employer that a ban is necessary to maintain plant
discipline or production .... In Babcock & Wilcox, on the other hand, nonemployees sought to enter an employer's property to distribute union organizational literature. The Board applied the rule of Republic Aviation in this
situation, but the Court held that there is a distinction 'of substance' between
'rules of law applicable to employees and those applicable to non-employees.' The difference was that the nonemployees in Babcock & Wilcox sought
to trespass on the employer's property, whereas the employees in Republic
Aviation did not.
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570-71 (1978) (citation omitted).
"A wholly different balance was struck when the organizational activity was carried on
by employees already rightfully on the employer's property, since the employer's management interests rather than his property interests were there involved." Hudgens, 424 U.S.
at 521-22 n.10.
Interestingly, in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Eastex, he disagreed with the
majority's analysis of the trespass/non-trespass distinction between Republic Aviation and
Babcock as well as with the distinction made in Hudgens. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 581-82 n.1.
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, however, had joined in the majority Hudgens
(Rehnquist, J.,
opinion in 1976. Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507. He viewed both cases as involving trespass, analyzing an employee rightfully on the property who failed to comply with conditions to
remain there as a trespasser also. Eastex, 437 U.S. 581-82 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Eastex case did not involve organizational activity, but rather the distribution of union
literature in the workplace. Id. at 558. The literature urged political activity by employees
in regard to labor related political issues. Id.
See Jack L. Whitacre, Property Rights and Pre-Emption Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 Mo. L. REV. 59, 60-61 (1982).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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with posted prohibitions against solicitation and/or distribution of literature. Nonemployees who failed to comply with these rules were treated
as trespassers because they violated their conditional right of entry as
members of the public. Other related cases involved employee parking
lots with access to the general public prohibited.
VIII.

DERIVATIVE NATURE OF UNION "RIGHTS"

However, it appears that the basic source of the union organizer's limited right to access to employer property under Babcock deserves reexamination. The very nature of this right should play a more definitive
role in determining when the exercise of this right will require nonemployee access to an employer's property for organizational purposes. The
leading pertinent Supreme Court cases seem to agree that the source of
the nonemployee union organizer's right is the right of the affected employees to self-organization under the NLRA and, therefore, the rights of
48
the nonemployee organizers are derivative in nature.
The seminal Babcock decision indicates, "The right of self-organization
depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organizationfrom others."'4 9 The 1972 Central Hardwaredecision declared:
[b]ut organizationrights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness
depends in some measure on the ability of employees, to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organizationfrom others. Early in the
history of the administrationof the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights... In seeking to provide information essential to the free
exercise of organization rights, union organizers have often engaged
in conduct inconsistent with traditional notions of private property
rights.50
The 1978 Sears decision did not address organization rights. Rather the
Sears decision addressed area standards picketing, and primarily ruled on
a federal pre-emption issue. Nevertheless, the Court commented:
[f]irst, the right to organize is at the very core of the purposefor which
the NLRA was enacted ... Second, Babcock makes clear that the
interests being protected by according limited-access rights to nonem48. The union's argument in Babcock was not that its organizers had a right to
enter the employer's property, but that the employees there had a right to
receive information concerning their right to organize. The derivative nature
of the nonemployee organizer's privilege to enter private property had been
recognized by the federal courts well before the Supreme Court's opinion in
Babcock.
Jay Gresham, Note, Still As Strangers: Nonemployee Union Organizers on Private Commercial Property, 62 TEx. L. REV. 111, 122 (1983) (citing NLRB v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 122
F.2d 149, 150 (2d Cir. 1941)).
49. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added). An early NLRB decision affirmed
that the basic rights of the NLRA included "full freedom to receive aid, advice, and information from others, concerning those rights and their enjoyment." NLRB v. Harlan Fuel
Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938).
50. Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
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ployee, union organizers are not those of the organizers but of the
employees located on the employer's property. The [Babcock] Court
indicated that 'no ... obligation is owed nonemployee organizers';
any right they may have to solicit on an employer's property is a derivative of the right of that5employer's
employees to exercise their organi1
zation rights effectively.
The 1975 Hudgens decision expanded the original Babcock doctrine to
include other rights protected by the Act, i.e., picketing in support of a
lawful economic strike. In citing Babcock, the Court stated: "Accommodation between employees' § 7 rights and employers' property rights...
'must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other.' "52
The 1992 Lechmere decision concurs with the Court's earlier findings in
regard to the source of pertinent rights. In the majority opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court stated, "By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers
rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers
.... [In Babcock] we recognized that... the employees' 'right of selforganization depends in some measure on [their] ability ... to learn the
advantages of self-organizationfrom others.' -53
IX.

A CLOSER LOOK AT SOURCE OF UNION "RIGHTS"

Thus, it appears clear that the union organizer's right of access to employer property is a derivative right,5 4 based entirely on the rights of the
51. Sears, 436 U.S. at 206 n.42 (emphasis added).
52. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 521 (emphasis added).
53. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 845 (emphasis added). In a post-Lechmere
decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated, "Babcock suggested that when
the NLRA requires an employer to grant access to his property to nonemployee organizers, it does so only to protect the rights of his employees." Davis Supermarkets, Inc.
v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1177 (D.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994) (emphasis
added).
54. The concept of a "derivative right" affecting the use or control of real property is
unusual. In the application involved in these comments, it permits a person to go onto
private property and take part in certain activities that are contrary to the property owner's
communicated prohibitions or regulations regarding the property. The property owner
may have prohibited persons other than a specified class from being on the property, as
when there is a parking lot operated exclusively for employees and nonemployees are prohibited access. Another application may be when the property owner allows access to the
general public, but prohibits certain activities on the property, as when a parking lot is
open to the public, but solicitation or distribution of literature of all kinds is prohibited on
the parking lot property.
When the "derivative right" concept is applied in such situations, the rights of persons on
the property at the owner's invitation or with his or her permission provide entry rights to
other persons, otherwise prohibited from entering the property, and/or rights to engage in
activities otherwise prohibited by the owner's restrictions and rules.
Instances in which such derivative rights impact property law and the normal rights of
property ownership appear to be rare. One of the leading cases in this area involves state
law, rather than federal, and a setting that does not directly impact federal labor law. In
New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), a staff attorney and a field worker for
nonprofit corporations funded by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity entered the
property of a landowner to provide health and legal services to migrant workers housed on
the property owner's farm. Id. at 370. Both of these services were within the scope of
services offered by the nonprofit corporations. Id. The staff members of the corporations
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affected employees to exercise their rights of self-organization under the
NLRA. While the Court may refer in short-hand fashion to the "rights"
of union organizers in these situations, in every case it is, in fact, referencing the underlying rights of the employees under the NLRA. To evaluate
and measure the nature of this derivative right, it becomes necessary to
look closely at the NLRA rights of the employees from which the rights
of non-employee union organizers draw their essence and substance.
In reviewing the basic rights of employees under the NLRA, it may be
useful to reconsider the "standards" of the Babcock decision concerning
when the employer cannot deny access to the nonemployee union organizer. These are: (1) when the employer's restrictions are enforced in a
discriminatory manner against the union, 55 (2) when reasonable efforts
by the union through other available channels of communication will not
enable it to reach the employees with its message, 56 (3) when inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts to communicate with them through the usual channels, 57 (4) when the location of a
plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees be58
yond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them,
or (5) when other means of organization are not readily available. 59
Many of these standards simply restate or give examples of standards previously expressed and the set of standards (other than the non-discrimination prohibition) should not be viewed as essentially different or
separate requirements. These standards are set out in connection with
the Court's general observation that "[t]he right of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others." 6
entered the property and refused to depart upon demand of the owner. Id. Consequently,
both were charged with and convicted of violating the state's trespass statute. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the owner could reasonably regulate the activities
of such "trespassers" on his property, but could not bar them completely. Id. at 374. The
court held that the conduct of the staff members was beyond the scope of the state trespass
statute and directed judgments of acquittal. Id. at 375. The court stated, "[W]e find it
unthinkable that the farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the migrant worker in
any respect significant for the worker's well-being." Id. at 374. The court spoke in terms
strikingly similar to the language of Babcock, indicating the importance of communication
to the migrant workers making them aware of their rights and opportunities, and necessary
"accommodation" between the rights of the workers and the landowner. Id. at 372-74.
While the contrasts between the factual patterns in Shack and Babcock are numerous, the
similarities are sufficient to note as an example of a derivative right impacting property
law. For comments on the Shack case and related matters, see generally, RICHARD H.
CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 325-40 (1988); CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 21-32 (3d ed. 1983); Curtis J. Berger, PruneyardRevisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 663-68 (1991); Joseph
William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 675-77 (1988).
55. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
59. Id. at 114.
60. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113.
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These standards, general though they may be, have become the
benchmarks of determining when nonemployee access is indicated. As a
result, both quantitative and qualitative measurements and evaluations
have been made by the NLRB and the judiciary in determining if the
standards are satisfied. In making these determinations, the full dimension of the union's "message" under Babcock is frequently overlooked or
minimized. In each instance of using these standards, the breadth of the
employees' rights under the NLRA must be considered. These rights are
the source of the nonemployee union organizer's "rights" and must be
considered in determining the adequacy of the union's alternative avenues of communication with the employees. The question is whether
these avenues of communication are sufficient to inform the employees of
their self-organizational rights under the NLRA so as to allow the employees to make informed decisions concerning whether they will be supportive of the union's activity in urging their self-organization.
X. SCOPE OF UNION "MESSAGE" UNDER BABCOCK
It would seem that a fair question to ask in connection with judging
whether the union has reasonable avenues to reach employees (other
than limited access to the employer's property) is: What is included in
the message that union organizers might reasonably be expected to provide employees concerning the "advantages of self-organization?" 61 Certainly the scope of the information concerning the employees' selforganization rights under the NLRA should impact and shape, to a degree, any evaluation of the adequacy of union access to the employees.
However, it appears from examining the leading pertinent Supreme
Court decisions that this subject rarely has been examined or explored to
any extent.
An examination of the employees' rights of self-organization under the
Act reveals that the message that union organizers should provide to employees is more than a simplistic notice that the union is seeking to organize the employees. It is worthwhile to re-examine these rights, which are
complex and would reasonably require some explanation of how they impact employees.
It may come as a surprise to employees that the legislated policy of the
United States, as set out in Section 1 of the NLRA, is to encourage the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and to protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. '62 Whether, in fact, such a policy is widely known
or accepted by the general population of the nation may be a matter for
private speculation and conjecture. Nevertheless, it is in the context of
61. Id.

62. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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such an announced policy that the basic rights of self-organization are set
out in the Act.
XI. ESSENTIALS FOR EMPLOYEE DECISION-MAKING
Before employees can make intelligent decisions concerning the advantages and disadvantages 63 of self-organization, they must be aware of
these rights and have at least a basic understanding of how they are affected by them.
Section 7 of the NLRA is pivotal in the rights afforded to employees
under the Act. This section explicitly states,
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities,
except to the extent that such a right to refrain is affected by a union shop
agreement between the employer and the union as authorized by Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. 64 The concepts and applications of this section of the
Act are not simple and have been the subject of many judicial decisions. 65
The limitations placed on employer activity that interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights are set out in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which indicates that certain employer actions are
unfair labor practices. 66 Again, the meaning and application of such interference, restraint, or coercion are not simplistic concepts and have frequently been addressed by the Supreme Court. 67
Included in the employer prohibitions set out in Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act is the specific prohibition of employer "discrimination in regard to
63. While Babcock spoke of the importance of employees learning the advantages of
self-organization, 351 U.S. at 113, Justice Powell, in writing the majority opinion in Central
Hardware,stated, "[blut organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness
depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others." Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added). Employees usually learn of the disadvantages of organization from their employers.
Both the NLRA and the courts provide ample opportunity for this employer activity. Section 8(c) of the NLRA provides that an employer is free to express its views concerning
organization, absent threat of reprisal or promise of benefit. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988).
Further, the employer or his representatives can engage in solicitation of support against
organization, even though this type of activity by employees might be regulated or even
prohibited under its rules. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am. [Nutone, Inc.], 357 U.S.
357 (1958). An employer may engage in "captive audience" speeches against organization
to its employees without affording a similar opportunity to the union. Livingston Shirt
Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
65. The full meaning of "concerted" activity has frequently been the subject of judicial
decision by the Supreme Court. Examples of such complex interpretation inquiries can be
found in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) and NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
67. An example of the Court's interpretation of verbal coercion can be found in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" as set
out in Section 8(a)(3). 68 Also included among possible employer unfair
labor practices is the domination or interference with the formation or
69
administration of labor organizations as set out in Section 8(a)(2).
Likewise, the full meaning of these statutory terms can only be ascertained by understanding the applicable NLRB and judicial decisions.
Included in an employee's understanding of her or his rights under the
Act must be the process by which union representation is achieved and
elections are conducted as set out in Section 9 of the NLRA. 70 These
statutory provisions are also impacted by NLRB rules and decisions as
well as judicial determinations.
It would seem essential to an employee's knowledge of the advantages
of self-organization to be aware of the employer's duty to bargain in good
faith with representatives of employees as set out in Section 8(a)(5) 7 1 and
Section 8(d) 7 2 of the Act. Again, the concept of bargaining in good faith
is a complex one, not easily ascertained from a reading of the Act absent
some knowledge of the Board and judicial interpretations of the statutory
language.
Further illustrations of the complex subject matter of rights guaranteed
by the Act to employees engaged in self-organization could be set out.
However, perhaps these will suffice to illustrate that making employees
aware of their rights under the Act and the advantages of self-organization is not a brief, simple exercise, quickly and easily achieved.
XII.

BABCOCK DOCTRINE: INFORMATIONAL IN NATURE

By way of repetition, a union representative's "right" of access to an
employer's property is a derivative one, based upon the rights of the affected employees to learn of their rights under the NLRA. Babcock and
its progeny indicate that the employees' right to learn the advantages of
self-organization is the source of union organizer's "rights" to have access
to employer property. The thrust of the Babcock doctrine must be informational in nature. The test is whether the alternatives to employer
property access provide an adequate means for the union to communicate its message to the employees involved. The union message is to inform the employees of their rights under the Act.
XIII. A PROPER TEST FOR ALTERNATIVE AVENUES
In examining whether alternative avenues available to the union satisfy
the Babcock criteria, it is impossible to evaluate the alternative methods
without a serious examination of the union's task in advising the employ68.
69.
70.
71.

29
29
29
29

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(3) (1988).
§ 158(a)(2) (1988).
§ 159 (1988).
§ 158(a)(5) (1988).

72. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
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ees adequately, if not fully, of their rights so that they can make informed
decisions concerning whether to support the union in exercising their
right of self-organization. As a result of such union access, the employees
should be aware, at least in a general way, of the nature of their protected
rights under the act, limitations placed on employers prohibiting interference with these rights, the process by which union representation can be
achieved, and the duty of employers to recognize the employees' choice
of a representative and to bargain in good faith with the representative.
As indicated earlier, many of the concepts related to these matters are
complex rather than simple. Some of these concepts may already be familiar to some of the employees. To other employees in the 1990s, these
concepts may be foreign and strange and not immediately or easily understood to a degree allowing them to make informed decisions about
whether they wish to exercise their rights of self-organization by supporting the union.
The Babcock doctrine speaks of the union's ability to reach the employees through available channels of communication with its "message,"
the advantages of self-organization, etc. In making the determinations
suggested by Babcock, it is essential to consider the scope of the
"message" and what it reasonably may entail in evaluating the alternative
methods available for the union to reach and communicate with the affected employees.
XIV.

IS MERE NOTICE PROPER ACCESS?

The genesis of the idea for this article resulted from reading the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Lechmere. The opinion comments
that actual contact with the employees by the union was not required by
the Babcock standards and that signs or advertising utilized by the union
may suffice. 73 The majority opinion then makes the observation that,
"[t]hus, signs (displayed, for example, from the public grassy strip adjoining Lechmere's parking lot) would have informed the employees about
the union's organizational efforts."'74 This remarkable statement is indicative of the majority's view of what is required under the Babcock requirement of employees being informed of the advantages of selforganization under the NLRA. A sign held so that those in passing vehicles can read it (a technique not infrequently used to advise the public of
a high school fund-raising car wash) would, in the majority's view, provide adequate access of the union to the employees. This illustration did
not fail to catch the attention of Justice White in his dissent. Justice
White observed
[m]oreover, the Court in Babcock recognized that actual communication with nonemployee organizers, not mere notice that an organization campaign exists, is necessary to vindicate Section 7 rights. If
employees are entitled to learn from others the advantages of self73. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -,
74. Id. at 849-50.

112 S. Ct. at 849.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

organization, it is singularly unpersuasive to suggest that the union
has sufficient access for this purpose by being able to hold up signs
from a public grassy strip adjacent to the highway leading to the
75
parking lot.
Thus, the issue is joined. What is the scope of the message and activity
of union organizers under Babcock to be used in deciding if they have
reasonable access to employees outside of the employer's property? The
writers suggest that under Babcock, far more than mere notice of a union
organizational campaign is required in the union's efforts to advise employees of their rights of self-organization. In fact, in the Babcock holding, the word "notice" is only used in connection with the employer
posting its property and never in regard to the activities of the nonemployee union organizers communicating with the affected employees con76
cerning their rights under the NLRA.
XV. BABCOCK SETTING
In the touchstone Babcock case, the Supreme Court held that the
union had reasonable avenues to communicate with the employees about
the advantages of self-organization without permitting union access to the
employer's property.7 7 In considering the nature of communication contemplated by the Court, it will be worthwhile to consider the setting of
the Babcock case. Of the employer's 500 employees, 40% lived within a
mile of the plant or in a community of 21,000 people and the remainder
within a thirty-mile radius. More than 90% of the workers came to work
78
in private automobiles and parked in the plant employee parking lot.
Noting that the plant was close to a small well-settled community where a
large percentage of the employees lived, the Court held that while the
living quarters of the employees were scattered, they were within "reasonable reach."'79 The Court commented that the usual methods of imparting information were available and cited its footnote 1 as an
indication of the validity of its conclusion. 80 Footnote 1 stated:
[o]ther Union contacts with employees: In addition to distributing
literature to some of the employees, as shown above, during the period of concern herein the Union has had other contacts with some
of the employees. It has communicated with over 100 employees of
Respondent on 3 different occasions by sending literature to them
through the mails. Union representatives have communicated with
many of Respondents' employees by talking with them on the streets
of Paris, by driving to their homes and talking with them there, and
by talking with them over the telephone. 81
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 107 n.1.

1995]

BABCOCK/LECHMERE REVISITED

Thus, the Court indicates the methods of communication included: (1)
the distribution of literature at the plant entrance at the driveway-highway junction, (2) mailing literature to 20% of the employees on three
occasions, (3) talking to "many" of the employees on the streets of the
small town in which, or near which, they lived, (4) driving to the employees' homes and talking with them, and (5) talking with them on the telephone. The Court does not indicate the number of employees reached by
the last three methods. Three of the methods indicated as the usual avenues of imparting information involved personal contact with the employees. It is interesting to note in the examples cited by the Court the high
involvement of such contact, giving opportunity for personal responses
and/or questions.
Justice Thomas is correct in his Lechmere comment that there is no
specific Supreme Court precedent that personal contact is required for
reasonable union access to employees. 82 However, equally lacking in
supporting precedent is his statement that "signs or advertising" may suffice to provide reasonable access to employees.8 3 As indicated earlier,
Justice White in his Lechmere dissent indicates that "actual communication" with nonemployee organizers is necessary to "vindicate" Section 7
rights and that mere "notice" of the union campaign will not suffice to
84
satisfy the Babcock requirements.
In the myriad of pre-Lechmere cases addressing what was required for
a union to have reasonable access to employees, there was no set litmus
test or criteria for judging whether the union access to employees satis82. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 849. The union's impersonal methods of contacting and communicating with employees away from the workplace may create substantial obstacles to effectiveness. Judge Clark of the Second Circuit stated that the impersonal
avenues
bear without exception the flaws of greater expense and effort, and a lower
degree of effectiveness. Mailed material would be typically lost in the daily
flood of printed matter which passes with little impact from the mailbox to
wastebasket. Television and radio appeals, where not precluded entirely by
cost, would suffer from competition with the family's favorite programs and
at best would not compare with personal solicitation. Newspaper advertisements are subject to similar objections.
NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963).
"Of the many possible alternative channels of communication identified by the Board
and the courts, media such as radio, television, newspapers, mass mailings, placards, posters, and billboards are 'impersonal' in the sense that they do not allow direct contact
between employees and nonemployee organizers." Jay Gresham, Note, Still as Strangers:
Nonemployee Union Organizerson Private Commercial Property,62 TEX. L. REV. 111, 137
(1983).
83. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 849.
84. Id. at 851.
First, we recognize that personal contact is an important part of any organizing effort. Whether to opt for a union, or not, is rarely a cut-and-dried proposition; there are pros and cons, the evaluation of which may be better suited
to the dynamics of lively discourse than to the static impersonality of more
remote approaches. Non-unionized workers are often fearful of management's reactions to the proposed introduction of a union, and personal contact is extremely useful in overcoming such timorousness.
Lechmere, 914 F.2d 313, 323 (lst Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
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fled the Babcock standards. It was correct and appropriate that no such
set formula was set out because in each case the basic factual pattern
varied. Justice Thomas declared that "[b]ecause the employees do not reside on Lechmere's property, they are presumptively not 'beyond the
reach' of the union's message. ' 85 Any such presumption would be
quickly rebutted by a showing that the union does not have reasonable
access to inform the employees of their rights of self-organization. His
reference is to the "logging camp" type of situation in which the employees are virtually isolated from contact by the union.86 The use of the
presumption language in cases like Lechmere is misleading, since even
the test applied by the Lechmere majority would involve evaluation of
avenues of access that are available to the union. The Court's comment is
based on the accepted rule that in cases of such complete or virtual isolation, there is a presumption that the union does not have reasonable access to the employees. 87 This was not the case in Babcock or Lechmere.
Clearly, the Babcock doctrine is not limited to such factual patterns.
XVI. LECHMERE MODIFICATION OF BABCOCK
While the majority Lechmere decision gives lip service to the Babcock
doctrine, it in essence changes the teaching of Babcock and expresses a
new rule in regard to nonemployee access to employer property for organizational purposes. Babcock spoke of accommodation between Section
7 rights and property rights, 88 and Hudgens also addressed such an accommodation with the locus of the accommodation falling at different
points along the spectrum, depending on the nature and strength of the
respective Section 7 and private property rights in any given context. 89
Lechmere holds that the accommodation inquiry is pertinent only in cases
in which union access to employees is "infeasible." 90 "So long as nonemployee union organizers have reasonable access to employees outside an
employer's property, the requisite accommodation has taken place." 9 1
The Lechmere Court indicates that the Babcock rule of access by nonemployees is limited to employees, who, "by virtue of their employment, are
isolated from the ordinary flow of information that characterizes our society." 92 Babcock speaks of the inability of reaching employees "through
85. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. at 849 (citing Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113).
86. The Lechmere Court cites what it describes as "classic examples" of such situations: logging camps, NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948);
mining camps, Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972); and mountain resort hotels,
NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967). Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112
S. Ct. at 849.
87. See generally STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. ScoTT, ORGANIZING AND
THE LAW 49, 50 (4th ed. 1991); Max Zimny, Access of Union Organizers to "Private" Property, 25 LAB. L.J., 618, 621-23 (1974).
88. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
89. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522.
90. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 849.
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other available channels of communication, '93 "the reasonable attempts
by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels"
being "ineffective" because of an inaccessibility of employees, 94 and employees being "beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them. ' 95 While the distinction may be subtle, it appears that
the Lechmere Court thinks in terms of the "ordinary flow of information
that characterizes our society," while the Babcock Court addresses actual
communication. This distinction is best seen in the Lechmere language
that the employees' mere awareness of the union organizational camthe employees may have to learn
paign satisfies any Section 7 right that
96
the advantages of self-organization.
In addressing the proper meaning of the Babcock requirement that the
employees are "beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, ' 97 Professor Roger C. Hartley has suggested that the
Babcock language is susceptible to at least two quite contrasting interpretations. The first, he notes, requires only an examination of whether the
union literally has the ability to gain access to the workers by exercising
reasonable efforts. Such an inquiry does not examine the quality of possible communication. The second, according to Professor Hartley, would
mean that the union's efforts are reasonable only if the resulting communication is "meaningful." He suggests that the Lechmere court "edged
the law toward the physical proximity view of Babcock & Wilcox, but did
not abandon completely the notion that the effectiveness of the resulting
'98
communication is a relevant consideration.
XVII.

LECHMERE STANDARDS

What then would satisfy the Lechmere criteria of situations in which
the Section 7 rights of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization would justify union nonemployee access to employer property? The
Lechmere decision indicates that "unique obstacles" to the union reaching the employees must exist before such employer property access would
93. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
94. Id. It has been suggested that the "effective" language under Babcock has fre-

quently been satisfied by finding that any alternative means of reaching the employees
exists, and that the practical sense of the word has not been addressed. However, the

Babcock language leaves open a consideration of relative effectiveness. Note, Nonemployee Union Organizers Granted Access to Company Property for Solicitation Purposes,
67 MICH. L. REV. 573, 578, 582 n.47 (1969).
95. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113. "The right of employees to act in concert for self-organization and other mutual aid and protection is the core of the national public policy embodied in the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining. Realization of this right requires a
maximum opportunity for effective communication with employees." Max Zimny, Access
of Union Organizers to "Private" Property, 25 LAB. L.J. 618, 624 (1974).
96. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 849-50.
97. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113.
98. Roger C. Hartley, The Supreme Court's 1991-1992 Labor and Employment Law
Term, 8 LAB. LAw. 757, 759-60 (1992). The authors fail to share Professor Hartley's view
that Lechmere gives room to consider the communication effectiveness issue. See supra
text accompanying note 14.
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be permitted, 99 and the decision seems to indicate that literal "isolation"
of the employees must exist before the property access would be permitted. 1°° This reasoning seems to be the basis of the Lechmere Court fastening on the Babcock illustration of employees' living quarters and the

plant location to fashion its presumption that because the employees do
not reside on the employer's property, they are presumptively not beyond
the reach of the union. 10 1 Thus, it would appear that virtual isolation of
the employees from the union or some other "unique obstacles" would be
required for the Babcock doctrine to function in allowing access to employer property. Such a strict reading of the Babcock decision departs
from earlier readings of Babcock by the Central Hardware, Hudgens and
Sears Courts.
XVIII.

ACCESS NOT SUCCESS

While the competition is fierce, probably the most intriguing statement
of the Lechmere Court is "[a]ccess to employees, not success in winning
them over, is the critical issue-although success, or lack thereof, may be
relevant in determining whether reasonable access exists."10 2 While the
phrase is catchy, it is difficult to recall any contention that union success
in organizing is pertinent in the Babcock inquiries in any way.' 0 3 Also, it
is difficult to know exactly what to do with the rest of the above quotation. If lack of success is relevant in determining whether access exists,
how, in fact, does such relevance function? Could failure of a union to
win the support of enough employees to establish "substantial interest"'1 4 in the union (as a basis for a representation petition) be the basis
99. Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 850.
100. Id. at 849.
101. Id. For a post-Lechmere decision involving the access issue, see Oakwood Hosp. v.
NLRB, 983 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1993).
102. ]Lechmere, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 850. The reversed Lechmere First Circuit
holding had noted,
Accessibility, in this context, is dichotomous. One aspect implicates the geography of the workplace .... The second aspect of accessibility implicates
the identifiability of the work force: if the union does not know, and cannot
readily learn, the names and addresses of the employees, alternative means
will in many cases shrink dramatically in effectiveness.
Lechmere, 914 F.2d 313, 323 n.12 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
103. It is not a direct object of the labor act to protect the desire of unions for
the most effective and simple organizational techniques; the act does not
guarantee success, but only that the avenues of communication are open
enough so that the employees may be informed adequately of their rights.
Dexter L. Hanley, Union Organizationon Company Property - A Discussion of Property
Rights, 47 GEO. L.J. 266, 301 (1958).
104. As a requirement for a representation election, Section 9(e)(1) of the NLRA requires a showing that 30% of the employees in a bargaining unit indicate a desire to be
represented by the union. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1988). Whether a union has adequate access
to employees outside of employer property is usually litigated as a Section 8(a)(1) unfair
labor practice complaint when the employer has (1) refused union access to the employer's
property, (2) used the local trespass law to remove union representatives from the property, or (3) threatened use of the trespass law when union representatives conducted orga-

nizational activity on employer property. See generally
JUDITH

A. Scorr,

ORGANIZING AND THE LAW

STEPHEN

I.

47-51 (4th ed. 1991).

SCHLOSSBERG AND
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of proving that the union did not have reasonable access? The answer is
likely "no" and this aspect of the Court's opinion is likely dictum without
practical utility.
Lost in the language of the Lechmere decision is meaningful attention
to the origin of the rights of the union nonemployee organizers under
Babcock. Their rights spring from the rights of employees to learn the
advantages of self-organization. The complex nature of these rights has
been discussed earlier. The Lechmere Court seems to indicate that mere
notice of a union organizational campaign can satisfy these Section 7
rights of the employees. Such a holding is consistent with the Court's
strict reading, if not out-right modification, of Babcock and with its view
that virtual isolation or unique obstacles to the union's efforts will be necessary before access to employer property is permitted. The Lechmere
holding minimizes the relative importance and nature of the Section 7
rights of the employees in its limited view of what is required to inform
employees of the advantages of self-organization under the NLRA.
XIX. CONCLUSION
Under Babcock and even under Lechmere's nominal endorsement of
the Babcock requirements, the question arises concerning whether the
union nonemployee organizers have reasonable access to affected employees to inform them of their rights of self-organization under the
NLRA. If not, the organizers may have a limited right to enter the employer property to reach the employees. There is no dispute that any
-rights the union may have in this regard spring from the Section 7 rights
of the employees and are, therefore, derivative in nature. In judging the
adequacy of union opportunities to communicate with employees short of
permitting them to enter employer property, the nature of the union
message is of critical importance. The message of the union organizers,
according to Babcock and progeny, is to inform the employees of their
rights under the Act. While attempted persuasion will obviously be involved, the informational aspect of this message must be emphasized. In
judging the adequacy of union access to employees, the nature of what
the union will attempt to communicate to the employees should be an
important feature of any such evaluation. Obviously, the informational
aspect of the union's task far exceeds mere notice of the union's organizational campaign.
No attempt will be made to review all of the possible avenues or mechanisms the union has for reaching the employees. Some may involve direct personal contact, others may not. Shifting and changing patterns of
commercial and residential development may impact the effectiveness of
alternative modes of reaching and communicating with employees. 10 5
105. The question of the union's right of entry has become increasingly important as employers move to suburban locales to avoid the disadvantages of an
urban environment. For many of these employers relocation has removed
them from municipal streets, where unions could communicate easily with

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

But as the NLRB and the courts attempt to decide if these avenues provide reasonable channels of communicating with the employees, in every
instance the nature of the union message that is contemplated in Babcock
should be considered. The employees have a Section 7 right to learn of
the advantages of self-organization. This includes the nature of their
rights under the Act, limitations on employer interference with these
rights, the process of a union gaining representation rights, the duty of
good faith bargaining on the part of the employer. All of these rights,
and arguably more, would be included when the employees learn the advantages of self-organization. Any union access to the employees that
would be deemed reasonable should provide some meaningful opportunity to effectively communicate such matters. It is submitted that access
that does not permit such opportunity is less than reasonable and should
be the basis for nonemployee union representatives being permitted onto
employer property, with proper regulation, to exercise their derivative
Section 7 rights of communicating with the employees. In such instances,
the employees may or may not decide to exercise their right of self-organization, but their decisions should be informed ones according to the standards first set out in Babcock.
Has the Lechmere decision made the union organizer's right of entry
onto employer property a less "murky" corner of the law? 10 6 The lack of
definitive guidelines in this area of the law prior to Lechmere may well
have resulted because "access cases are highly fact-intensive, and the
Board's decisions often turn on narrow factual points."'10 7 Under Lechmere, this area of law may be less "murky" due to the narrow application
of Babcock concepts and principles propounded by the Lechmere majority. While the Lechmere standards are simple and narrow, they have destroyed the flexibility and adaptability of the Babcock principles' 0 8 that
employees, customers and suppliers, to relatively isolated areas, often to
large shopping centers or industrial parks. Union communication is hampered because intended addressees drive onto the employer's property.
Also, forcing a union to conduct its activity from the outskirts of a shopping
center or industrial park rather than in close proximity to the target employer diffuses the focus and softens the impact on that employer and at the
same time increases the danger of undesired impact on neutral employers.
Suburbanization has also meant that employee residences are scattered over
wider areas. As it becomes increasingly difficult for union representatives to
communicate with employees, customers and suppliers, the need for access
to the employer's property becomes more important.
Michael A. Broomfield, Preemptive FederalJurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union
Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV. 552, 553 (1970).

106. See supra text accompanying note 1. While Judge Selya's Circuit Court of Appeals
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in its Lechmere holding, the Court's reversal
does not take issue with Judge Selya's description of this area of the law.
107. Peter J. Ford, The NLRB, Jean Country, and Access To Private Property: A Reasonable Alternative To Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication under Fairmont
Hotel, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 683, 702 (1991).
108. "The Babcock & Wilcox test ... is full of open-ended language: inaccessibility,
ineffective, reasonable attempts, communicate, usual channels." Robert A. Gorman,
Union Access to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 9
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 12 (1991). One commentator has praised the Lechmere "standard
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allowed protection and application of affected employees' Section 7 rights
of self-organization in varying appropriate situations.
An intriguing inquiry relates to the status of Babcock and the principles and standards set by it in regard to nonemployee union access to
employer property. Lechmere did not overrule the Babcock holding; it
merely interpreted parts of it to suit its purposes. It is anticipated that
future reconstituted panels of the Supreme Court will look not only at
Lechmere for guidance, but also at the seminal Babcock holding in confronting the central issues addressed in both holdings.
Intelligent persons may differ in good faith over the viability and need
of self-organization and unions today. Obviously, such disagreement will
continue. Ultimately, the work force, also made up of intelligent persons
of good faith, will determine the need for organized labor. 10 9 Of vital
importance, however, is that employees be permitted to make such
choices about the advantages and disadvantages of self-organization
based upon adequate knowledge and information.

[as being one] that is quickly and easily administered." Michael L. Stevens, The Conflict
Between Union Access and Private Property Rights: Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the
Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1367 (1992). To the contrary, another
writer indicates, "The [Lechmere] Court's deviation from Babcock also may damage the
sense of certainty that the test established in Babcock provided the parties involved in a
conflict between organizational Section 7 rights and property rights." Jeff T. Courtney,
Note, Nonemployee Union Organizers and Access to PrivateProperty: Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 585, 604 (1993) (footnote omitted).
109. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in authoring the majority opinion upholding
the constitutionality of the NLRA observed,
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they
were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee
was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily
on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that
union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with
their employer.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (citation omitted). Today's
employees may or may not share the sense of frustration and impotency in regard to their
work environment that was described by Chief Justice Hughes over a half century ago.
Even if they experience similar concerns, they may or may not consider unions or organized labor an effective remedy.

